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Abstract
The ”free rider” problem has long plagued pedagogies based on
collaborative learning. The most common solution to the free rider
problem is peer evaluation. As well other existing methods of peer
evaluation include self-evaluation — and hence are prone to grade
inflation or, as we show here, are inaccurate in that they do not fairly
reward the most hard working student. Another common concern with
existing methods of peer evaluation is that students often do not have
the necessary skills to evaluate the work of their peers objectively.
In this paper, we introduce a new mechanism for peer evaluation
that does not rely on self-evaluation, and yet remains accurate, i.e.,
if all students are completely truthful in their evaluations, then the
output of our mechanism becomes an objective truth. At the same
time, our mechanism integrates the instructor’s judgment with respect
to the credibility of students’ evaluations. For example, the instruc-
tor gives scores to students for writing credible reviews and, in turn,
subsequent students’ evaluations are weighted according to these in-
structor scores.
Keywords: peer evaluation, collaborative learning, cooperative learning
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1 Introduction
A vast body of literature exists on methods of assessment in tertiary edu-
cation — see, for example, [10]. In practice, however, written final exams
prevail, even though most students will never take an exam in their life after
graduation and therefore exam grades are hardly able to capture the true
potential of a student to thrive in a complex work environment.
Even though most people never take formal exams after leaving school,
working in teams and writing reports are typical job tasks of modern homo
sapiens. Team work and report writing are taught at universities, but grad-
ing every individual student fairly based on a team’s report is a challenge.
For instance, if all the team members get the same grade, then a free-rider
problem may occur (see [7], [5], [1]).
The most obvious solution of the free-rider problem is peer evaluation (see
[3]). The simplest and yet popular approach to peer evaluation is letting each
student grade contribution of each of the team members in absolute terms,
i.e., out of 10, a 100, as A, B, C or in a similar way (see, for example, [4],
[8], or [9]). According to our experience, peer evaluation in absolute terms
results to almost all students giving maximal scores to each other just not
to jeopardize their friends’ final grade. Thavikulwat and Chang criticize the
whole idea of peer evaluation in [12] and propose to replace it with a different
procedure based on students choosing their preferred group size.
Note that while the free rider problem may plague a variety of collabo-
rative learning activities, such as team-based learning (see [11]), the main
scenario that we have in mind is a team of students collaborating on a well-
defined list of tasks. The group size then should equal, roughly, the number
of individual tasks within the project and therefore varying the group size is
not an option.
There exist sophisticated peer evaluation systems. The system described
in [1] is based on each student allocating a certain number of points between
their teammates. Kauffman et al. introduce in [6] a mixed system where
students give each other ratings from a list of nine terms such as ”excellent”,
”very good” etc. but these ratings are then converted into a numeric value
by dividing everyone rating by the team’s average.
A rigorous mathematical theory of peer evaluation is outlined in [2]. How-
ever, the theoretical work [2] is very broad and aimed at mathematicians —
experts in game theory. In this paper, we are going to narrow the scope
of the theory and to simplify it so it becomes accessible by educators and
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education researchers.
A system of peer evaluation is a procedure of calculating the ”true” (at
least, as it is perceived by team members) contribution of each of the team
members into the common task based on mutual evaluations reported by
team members. A system of peer evaluation may or may not have certain
desired qualities. One such quality is resistance to grade inflation. A system
of peer evaluation that includes self-evaluation as part of the process is prone
to grade inflation because students have incentive to overestimate their own
contribution. The second desired quality is accuracy. A system of peer
evaluation is accurate if it outputs true contributions of each of the team
members whenever they all report the truth. As we show below, there exist
systems of peer evaluation that are accurate but prone to grade inflation and
systems that do not rely on self-evaluation but are not accurate. The third
quality that may also be desired of a peer evaluation system is integration
of the instructor’s judgment into the system. The reason for integrating the
instructor’s judgment into the system is that students either may not have
the expertise to evaluate their peers or may not have incentive to do it fairly.
The instructor will then serve as moderator.
In this paper, we develop a system of peer evaluation that is accurate,
does not rely on self-evaluation, and integrates the instructor’s judgment.
2 Mathematical Theory
We assume that n students collaborate on a common goal of completing a set
of well-defined tasks and there exist the objective truth — the share of total
work that each student has accomplished. If the true contribution/share of
the i th student is ti, then the objective truth is the vector
t = (t1, t2 . . . , tn), where t1 ≥ 0, t2 ≥ 0, . . . , tn ≥ 0
and t1 + t2 + · · ·+ tn = 1
The vector t is known to students but can’t be observed by the course in-
structor directly and the system of peer evaluation should motivate students
to reveal the truth to the instructor. What students report to the instructor
is a matrix A of evaluations of each student by each student. Let entries of
this matrix be denoted aij – evaluation of student i by student j. We assume
that aij ≥ 0 (even though systems of peer evaluation with negative scores
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exist, one can convert such a system to a system with non-negative scores
simply by taking the exponential function of each score).
For each i, the vector Ai∗ = (ai1, ai2, . . . , ain) is the vector of evaluations
received by student i and, for each j, the vector A∗j = (a1j , a2j , · · · , anj) is
the vector of evaluations reported by student j.
2.1 Mechanism
A mechanism (term adopted from [2]) is an algorithm of calculating the
vector of perceived students’ contributions / shares of workload
s = (s1, s2 . . . , sn), where s1 ≥ 0, s2 ≥ 0, . . . , sn ≥ 0
and s1 + s2 + · · ·+ sn = 1
from the matrix A = (aij)1≤i≤n,1≤j≤n. Note that the output of the mecha-
nism, i.e., the vector s of perceived contributions may or may not be equal
to the vector t of true contributions.
A mechanism may or may not rely on self-evaluation. If students are not
required to report a self-evaluation, we let aii = 0 for all i. A mechanism
that relies on self-evaluation will be prone to grade inflation — a student
will be tempted to give an unfairly high evaluation to himself.
A mechanism is accurate if outputs true contributions of each team mem-
ber whenever all students are truthful. In other words, if, for each j, the
vector A∗j = (a1j , a2j , · · · , anj) reported by student j is proportional to the
vector of true contributions t = (t1, t2, . . . , tn), then we must get s = t.
If the course instructor’s purpose is to fairly evaluate each student’s indi-
vidual contribution to the team effort, the mechanism should be accurate and
should not rely on self-evaluation. However, as we show below, mechanisms
that are widely used in practice, usually have one of these two qualities, but
not both. Currently, mechanisms used in practice are mostly variations of
one of the following two.
Pie-to-all mechanism
The pie-to-all mechanism works as follows. Each student gets one pie and
then distributes her pie among all team members, including herself, in propor-
tion to their contribution to the team effort. The final perceived contribution
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of a team member is the average piece of pie that he received from all the
team members. It means that we have
aij ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
aij = 1, si =
1
n
n∑
j=1
aij. (1)
It is easy to show that pie-to-all is an accurate mechanism. However, it relies
on self-evaluation and hence is prone to grade-inflation. Clearly, the best
strategy to student j is to report ajj = 1 and aij = 0 for i 6= j.
Still, the pie-to-all mechanism has been used in practice — see, for ex-
ample, [6].
Pie-to-others mechanism
The pie-to-others mechanism works as follows. Each student gets one pie
and then distributes her pie among all her teammates, not including herself,
in proportion to their contribution to the team effort. The final perceived
contribution of a team member is the average piece of pie that he received
from all the team members. It means that we have
aij ≥ 0, aii = 0,
n∑
i=1
aij = 1, si =
1
n
n∑
j=1
aij . (2)
The only difference with the pie-to-all mechanism (1) is the absence of self-
evaluation, which is expressed by aii = 0.
The pie-to-others is a very popular mechanism, probably the most popular
one. Its clear advantage is that it does not rely on self-evaluation. However,
a huge issue with the pie-to-others mechanism is that it is not accurate as
the following example shows.
Example 1 Suppose that we have a team of three students and the vector
of true contributions is
t =
(
1
2
,
1
4
,
1
4
)
.
The matrix of peer-evaluations and the the vector of perceived contributions
are
A =

 0 2/3 2/31/2 0 1/3
1/2 1/3 0

 , s =

 4/95/18
5/18

 6=

1/21/4
1/4


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In our experience, real students, at least those whose major is mathemat-
ics, understand very well that the pie-to-others mechanism is not accurate.
Students will not be happy if a large portion of their grade comes from this
mechanism.
However, the inaccuracy of pie-to-others is not the only problem of this
mechanism. Well, pie-to-others still gives the highest score to the most hard-
working student in a team, even though that score may not accurately reflect
the true contribution. Let’s demonstrate the other issue by an example.
Example 2 Consider a hypothetical team of three students whose vector of
true contributions is
t =
(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0
)
.
The matrix of peer evaluations and the the vector of perceived contributions
are
A =

0 1 1/21 0 1/2
0 0 0

 , s =

1/21/2
0

 = t,
which means that now all the students are fairly rewarded.
Thus it is profitable for strongest students to just do all the work by
themselves without letting their teammates do anything. It’s then (and only
then) that they will be fairly rewarded for their hard work. This behav-
ior is very common in practice and a serious weakness of the pie-to-others
mechanism is that it incentivizes such behavior.
3 Results
In this section, we outline a new mechanism that is accurate but does not
rely on self-evaluation.
3.1 Auxiliary matrix
Let aij be raw evaluations of student i by student j for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We are going to construct an auxiliary matrix B whose entries bij show
relative contributions of students i and j, the ratio of i’s contribution to j’s
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contribution according to other team members. If k is any student other
than i and j, then
aik
aik + ajk
(3)
is the share of i’s contribution in the combined i’s and j’s contribution ac-
cording to k. Therefore,
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
aik
aik + ajk
is the average share of i’s contribution in the combined i’s and j’s contribution
according to their teammates. Thus,
bij =
∑
k 6=i,j
aik
aik+ajk∑
k 6=i,j
ajk
aik+ajk
(4)
is the average ratio of i’s contribution to j’s contribution according to their
teammates.
Note that (3) does not change if we multiply all evaluations reported by
a student by a constant. It means that it is not necessary to normalize the
matrix of peer-evaluations A to compute the auxiliary matrix B.
Example 3 Consider a team of 3 students with true contributions t =
(0.2, 0.3, 0.5). The matrix of peer-evaluations and the auxiliary matrix are
A =

0 2 23 0 3
5 5 0

 , B =

 1 2/3 2/53/2 1 3/5
5/2 5/3 1


Note that each column of the matrix B is proportional to t.
3.2 Instructor’s judgment
It is not realistic to expect that actual students would be completely truthful
and absolutely precise in their evaluations. In our experience, students who
contribute least of all usually tend not to put too much thought into evalua-
tions that they submit and often simply give equal scores to everyone. It is
therefore important to have some procedure of discrediting evaluations that
are not trustworthy.
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In our mechanism, students not only give numeric evaluations to each
other, but also provide justifications, i.e., write short reports on each of their
teammates. The instructor will then read these reports and give students
grades for writing the good trust-worthy reports. Let wi be the grade given
to student i by the instructor for writing reports.
We will now modify the construction of the auxiliary matrix B in order
to integrate trustworthiness of students’ reports into it. Specifically, (4) is
replaced with
bij =
∑
k 6=i,j
wk·aik
aik+ajk∑
k 6=i,j
wk·ajk
aik+ajk
, (5)
i.e., the average is replaced with weighted average.
Example 4 Consider four students and true contributions
t = (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4).
Suppose also that the vector of grades for writing reports is w = (4, 0, 1, 3).
Probably, student 1 wrote nice trustworthy reports, student 2 did not write
anything, student 3 wrote something short and not very meaningful, and
student 4 wrote meaningful reports but missed some points. At the same
time, students 1 and 4 are truthful in their evaluations, student 2 gave same
scores to everyone and student 3 was not completely truthful so that the
matrix of raw evaluations is
A =


0 1 11 1
2 0 19 2
3 1 0 3
4 1 39 0


Then the auxiliary matrix is
B =


1 0.518987 0.333333 0.282051
1.92683 1 0.666667 0.497418
3 1.5 1 0.75
3.54545 2.01038 1.33333 1


For instance,
b12 =
1·a13
a13+a23
+ 3·a14
a14+a24
1·a23
a13+a23
+ 3·a24
a14+a24
=
11
11+19
+ 3·1
1+2
19
11+19
+ 3·2
1+2
= 0.518987
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3.3 Missing values
In practice, some students fail to submit evaluations of their teammates,
i.e., a real matrix A may have missing values. In this case, the instructor
will give a zero score for reports to students who did not write any reports
and impute their missing numeric evaluations with equal scores. Such non-
existing evaluations will be then automatically discarded.
3.4 Main mechanism
To calculate ”true” individual contributions of each team member from a
matrix A of peer evaluations, we let the instructor grade reports written by
each student on their teammates. Let wk be the grade given to student k by
the instructor, we calculate the auxiliary matrix B by (5). Then the entry
bij of the auxiliary matrix is the relative contribution of student i to student
j according to their teammates. We also have bii = 1 for all i and bij =
1
bji
.
Note that if everyone were completely truthful, then each column of the
matrix B would be proportional to the true contributions of the team mem-
bers. In practice, however, columns of the matrix B may not be proportional
to each other due to difference in students’ opinions. Another practical issue
is that there may be students who don’t contribute at all. If j is such a
student, i.e., tj = 0, then we would have
bij =


1, if i = j,
∞, if ti > 0,
undefined, if i 6= j and ti = 0
The final scores are computed from the matrix B by
s = Averagej
B∗j∑n
i=1 bij
, (6)
where the average is taken over all columns j that do not have infinite or
missing values. Note that we normalize each column B∗j dividing it by the
sum of its entries, to ensure that sum of entries of the vector s is 1.
Theorem 1 Suppose that at least two students made positive contribution to
the team’s work and that there are at least three students who evaluated each
of their teammates and got positive grades from the instructor for reports
that they wrote. Then the mechanism given by (6) is accurate.
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Proof The assumptions are needed to ensure that the matrix B is well-
defined and has at least two columns with finite entries. The rest is straight-
forward — to show that the mechanism is accurate, we need to prove that
its output is the objective truth assuming that all evaluations are truthful.
If all the students report the objective truth, then we have
aij =
ti
1− tj
From (5), we get
bij =
∑
k 6=i,j
wk·
ti
1−tk
ti
1−tk
+
tj
1−tk∑
k 6=i,j
wk
tj
1−tk
ti
1−tk
+
tj
1−tk
=
∑
k 6=i,j
wkti
ti+tj∑
k 6=i,j
wktj
ti+tj
=
ti
∑
k 6=i,j
wk
ti+tj
tj
∑
k 6=i,j
wk
ti+tj
=
ti
tj
,
which completes the proof.
3.5 Evaluating truthfulness
Although our mechanism is accurate and does not rely on self-evaluation,
there is still a practical consideration that it does not address. Sometimes,
two friends may cheat the system by giving unfairly high evaluations to each
other. If they write convincing reports, the course instructor will overlook
the deceit.
The following method was proposed in [2] to discourage such behavior.
We actually require students to report self-evaluations, i.e., we have aii > 0.
Even though self-evaluations are discarded when the mechanism output is
computed according to (6), all evaluations reported by a student, including
the self-evaluation, are used to measure to which extend evaluations A∗j
reported by student j deviate from the final scores s.
Let us introduce the notation
cij =
aij∑n
i=1 aij
for contribution of student i according to student j. Then
∣∣∣∣cij − tjtj
∣∣∣∣
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is the relative error of evaluation of student i by student j and
Ej =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣cij − tjtj
∣∣∣∣ (7)
is the average relative error of student j’s evaluations.
3.6 Summary of our mechanism
In practice, the main score computed by the mechanism according to (6)
constitute 90% of the final score, with 5% given for writing reports and
5% given for consistency of evaluations submitted by a student with scores
calculated by the main mechanism. Thus the final score given to student i is
0.9si + 0.05wi + 0.05(1−min(1, Ei)), (8)
where si is the output of the main mechanism computed according to (6), wi
is the score given by the instructor to student i for reports that i wrote, and
Ei is the average relative error of i th evaluations found according to (7).
Note that the average of scores given by (8) is usually smaller than 1 and
equals 1 if and only if all evaluations submitted by students are completely
truthful. Another remark is that the weights 0.9, 0.05, and 0.05 for the
output of the main mechanism, reports, and consistency of evaluations with
output of the main mechanism are not justified by data or theory and finding
”right” weights may be a subject of future research.
4 Discussion
Our mechanism is accurate. However, even though it does not rely on self-
evaluation, it may be possible to manipulate it.
Example 5 Suppose that we have a team of three students and the vector
of true contributions is
t =
(
1
2
,
1
4
,
1
4
)
.
Suppose that the third student decided to manipulate the mechanism and
reported incorrect evaluations by claiming that the first and the second stu-
dent contributed equally. Assume also that the course instructor did not
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see it and graded all reports as being equally trust-worthy. The matrix of
peer-evaluations and the auxiliary matrix are
A =

 0 2/3 1/21/2 0 1/2
1/2 1/3 0

 , B =

 1 1 21 1 1
1/2 1 1


The vector of percieved contributions is then
s =
1
3

2/52/5
1/5

+ 1
3

1/31/3
1/3

+ 1
3

1/21/4
1/4


Then the perceived contribution of the third student is 47
180
> 1
4
. It means
that by changing his evaluations of other students, he changed his own score.
Note that although manipulating our mechanism is not as straightforward
as manipulating the pie-to-all mechanism, it is still possible.
A mechanism is called incentive compatible if lying does not improve one’s
own score given that others tell the truth. In other words, a mechanism is
incentive compatible if the collective truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium. A
mechanism is not manipulable if changing evaluations of other students one
reports does not change one’s own score. Note that a mechanism that is not
manipulable is automatically incentive compatible, but not vice versa.
Our mechanism is manipulable, but we believe that it will become incen-
tive compatible if a small portion of the final score is given for consistency of
scores reported by a student with the team’s perceived contributions. How-
ever, determining that small portion (in practice, we use 10%, but we don’t
have justification for that number) is still an open problem. We don’t know
if there exists an accurate mechanism that is not manipulable. We believe
that it does not, but proving it is another open problem.
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